From Speer's IMT testimony: The decrees issued by Sauckel were unobjectionable, but the works managers did not always find it possible to carry through the decrees for reasons which were outside their power. The bombing attacks brought about difficulties, disorganized transportation, or destroyed living quarters. It is not possible to make the managers responsible for the observance of these decrees under circumstances which often took on catastrophic proportions after the summer of 1944. These were times of crises and it was a matter for the Reich authorities to determine just how far it was possible to carry through these decrees and it is not right to push this responsibility on the little works manager. Within the framework of the above-mentioned responsibility which industry enjoyed, the armament factory managers had received a semiofficial function from me. This, of course, applied only to technical tasks. There were some industries which concerned themselves with secret matters; but in such cases the works trustee of the Labor Front was represented, and he could report to the Gauleiter on conditions in the factory through the Gauobmann (chief of the Labor Front in a Gau).

From Speer's IMT testimony: That was in 1943 [that I filled out an application to join the SS] when Himmler wanted me to get a high rank in the SS. He had often wanted it before when I was still an architect. I got out of it by saying that I was willing to be an ordinary SS man under him because I had already been an SS man before. Thereupon, Gruppenfuehrer Wolff provisionally filled out an application form and wanted to know what my previous SS activities had been in 1932. It came up during his inquiries that in those days I was never registered as a member of the SS, and because of this they did not insist on my joining as I did not want to become a new member now. I became well known for turning down all these honorary ranks. I did not want them because I felt that one should only hold a rank where one had responsibility. I had too little contact with the SS, and did not want any responsibility in that connection.

From Speer's IMT testimony: We gave out many millions of packages to armament plants. They contained additional food, chocolate, cigarettes, and so forth; and these bonuses were given in addition to all the extra food rations which were determined by the Food Ministry for those who worked longer hours or who did heavy work. In the industries, these bonuses were given to all workers without distinction, including the foreign workers, prisoners of war, and the workers from concentration camps.

From Speer's IMT testimony: It is important to note that the demands made of industries were only in the manner of production schedules and it was up to the industries to place their demands as to manpower, machinery, and material on the basis of these schedules. Working time should remain uniform in modern assembly-line production during the entire month. Due to the bombing attacks, delays in supplying tools and raw materials set in. As a result the number of hours of work varied from 10 to 12 a day. The average, according to our statistics, might have been 60 hours to 64 hours a week. They were exactly the same as for all the other workers in the industry, for the workers from concentration camps were on the whole only a part of the workers employed; and these workers were not called upon to do any more work than the other workers in the factory. There was a demand on the part of the SS that the inmates of concentration camps be kept in one part of the factory. The supervisors consisted of German foremen and specialists. The working hours, for inherent reasons, had to be coordinated with those of the entire industry, for it is a known fact that there is only one rhythm of work in a given industry.

The work camps were established so that long trips to the factories could be avoided and in this way permit the workers to arrive fresh and ready for work. Furthermore, the additional food which the Food Ministry had granted for all workers, including the workers from concentration camps' would not have been received by these men if they had come directly from big concentration camps; for then this additional food would have been used up in the concentration camp. In this way, those workers who came from concentration camps received, in full measure, bonuses which were granted in the industry, such as cigarettes or additional food.

From Speer's Spandau Draft: Just before the time when the situation in Stalingrad became completely hopeless, thinking some music might help clear my brain, I accompanied my wife, who like everybody else still suspected nothing untoward in the Eastern war, to a performance of The Magic Flute at the opera. But sitting in our box, in those softly upholstered chairs among this festively attired audience, all I could think of was that same kind of crowd at the Paris Opera when Napoleon was retreating in Russia, and of the now identical suffering of our own soldiers. I suddenly felt violently ill with palpitations and fled to the ministry, back to work, where I tried to suppress my horrible feelings of guilt toward my brother, who as a private in the Sixth Army was caught at Stalingrad, and where I tried to hammer into my brain Hitler's order, "Think of nothing except your own sphere of activity--there is no such thing as collective responsibility."

From Speer's Nuremberg Draft: I had seen my brother last the previous summer when he was home on leave. He came to see me at the office but I had people waiting, an official lunch, meetings scheduled. Even so, going against Hitler's rule which prohibited people holding high rank in government from extending privileges to thier relatives, I promised that I would get him out of Russia at the end of this campaign and get him into a construction battalion in the West for the remainder of the war.

From Speer's IMT testimony: According to my recollection, and also from having read the records I received of the Fuehrer conferences, there are two phases to be distinguished. The first one ended in October 1942, during which there were frequent joint conferences with Sauckel, which I attended. During these conferences the distribution of labor for the next months was discussed in detail. After that time there were no longer any conferences with Hitler, which went into detail, at which I was present. I only know of the conferences of January 1944, and then there was another conference in April or May 1944 which has not yet been mentioned here. During those conferences there was only a general discussion, and the distribution was then carried out in accordance with the directives, as Sauckel says. I can confirm Sauckel's testimony that his orders concerning the occupied territories always came from Hitler, since he needed Hitler's authority to assert himself in occupied territory.

From Speer's IMT testimony: I considered it right that workers who violated labor discipline should be punished, but I did not demand supplementary measures in this regard. As a matter of principle, I represented the view that a satisfactory work output on the part of 14 million workers could be achieved in the long run only through the good will of the worker himself. This is a bit of experience which applies generally, causing every employer in the world to do all in his power to have his workers satisfied. Naturally I supported them [efforts made by Sauckel to improve the social conditions of the workers], even though I did not have any jurisdiction along that line; and the same reasons which I have just mentioned applied, for our experience showed that labor which is satisfied has much less loss in the way of material. This for me was very important, considering our deficiency in raw materials. It is obvious moreover that the better quality produced by satisfied laborers is of special significance in time of war.

I made the remark as reproduced by the stenographic record. Here, however, I had an opportunity to read all the shorthand notes of the Central Planning Board and I discovered that this remark was not followed up in any way and that no measures by me were demanded . . . .

Yes, we did use it [forced labor from the concentration camps] in the German armament industry. That [that 'slackers' be sent to the concentration camps] was the question of the so-called "Bummelanten," and by that name we meant workers who did not get to their work on time or who pretended to be ill. Severe measures were taken against such workers during the war, and I approved of these measures . . . .

It is certain that concentration camps had a bad reputation with us, and the transfer to a concentration camp, or threat of such a possibility, was bound to reduce the number of absentees in the factories right from the beginning. But at that meeting, as I already said yesterday, there was nothing further said about it. It was one of the many remarks one can make in wartime when one is upset . . . . I did not know, of course, what I have heard during this Trial, but the other thing was a generally known fact. Yes [it was known throughout Germany that the concentration camps were pretty tough places to be put], but not to the extent which has been revealed in this Trial. No doubt concentration camps were a means, a menace used to keep order . . . .

I assert that a great number of the foreign workers in our country did their work quite voluntarily once they had come to Germany.

From Speer's IMT testimony: In my opinion, a state functionary has two types of responsibility. One is the responsibility for his own sector and for that, of course, he is fully responsible. But above that I think that in decisive matters there is, and must be, among the leaders a common responsibility, for who is to bear responsibility for developments, if not the close associates of the head of State?

This common responsibility, however, can only be applied to fundamental matters, it cannot be applied to details connected with other ministries or other responsible departments, for otherwise the entire discipline in the life of the State would be quite confused, and no one would ever know who is individually responsible in a particular sphere. This individual responsibility in one's own sphere must, at all events, be kept clear and distinct.

From Speer's IMT testimony: The concept which is frequently used here, war production (Kriegsproduktion), is nothing else but the ordinary concept, production. It comprises everything which is manufactured industrially or by artisans, including the civilian needs.

The concept of 'armaments' was in no way restricted to that sphere which was outlined through the Geneva prisoner-of-war agreement. The modern concept of "armaments" is a much more comprehensive one. It includes a much wider sphere of activity. There were no basic principles set down for our concept of 'armaments', The characteristic of an armament factory was that as an intermediary authority, the Armament Inspectorate took care of it and watched over it. In Germany, for instance, the entire production of raw steel belonged to armament; all rolling mills, foundries and forges; the production or the manufacture of aluminum and modern synthetic materials; the chemical production of nitrogen or fuel or synthetic rubber; the production of synthetic wool; the manufacture of individual items the use of which in armament cannot be predicted at the time of their manufacture such as ball bearings, gears, valves, engine pistons, and so forth, or the production of tool machinery; the setting up of assembly lines; similarly the manufacture of motor cars and the construction of locomotives, of merchant ships, also textile factories, and factories manufacturing leather goods or wooden wares.

In the interrogatories which I sent to my witnesses, I tried to have stated what percentage of the German armament industries produced armaments as defined by the Geneva Convention, and I should like to give you the figures. My co-workers agree unanimously that between 40 and 20 percent of our armament program was concerned with the production of weapons, armored cars, planes, warships, or the general equipment which the various branches of the Armed Forces required. The bulk of the material, therefore, was not armament in the sense of the Geneva Convention. The reason for the expansion of the concept of 'armament' in Germany was, besides manufacturing reasons, the preferential treatment which applied to these industries, a treatment which resulted in numerous industries clamoring to be called armament industries.

The demands for workers were split up into various sectors, according to the different economic branches. There were approximately 15 different sectors which placed their demands. I placed demands for Army and Navy armament and for construction, and beginning with September of 1943, for the sectors chemistry, mining, and other production. Air armament had its special labor allocation department, and their demands were voiced by the Reich Air Ministry.

From Speer's IMT testimony: We had not got as far as that [researches conducted in atomic energy], unfortunately, because the finest experts we had in atomic research had emigrated to America, and this had thrown us back a great deal in our research, so that we still needed another year or two in order to achieve any results in the splitting of the atom. Especially in this sphere it was a great disadvantage to us [to drive people out who didn't agree with Germany].

From Sauckel's IMT testimony: This note or rather this decision did not come from me. This was a communication which came from the Fuehrer's headquarters, based on a decision made by the Fuehrer. In spite of that—and I want to emphasize that particularly—my attitude towards the French Government did not change, and it does not say so in this record either. I continued to adopt the same polite attitude in my negotiations with the Government, and I ask the Tribunal to be allowed to make a short statement on how these negotiations with the French Government were conducted.

The only thing towards which I worked was the program which I drew up and which is in the possession of the Tribunal; a program which I admit, and for which I take all the consequences and the responsibility, even for my subordinates. This program was carried out through my decrees, which are also available in full. The development of the war did not permit me to give full consideration to the circumstances which now, post faction, appear obvious. We ourselves stood in the midst of the flow of events as the war developed and did not have time to ponder over such matters.

The Sperrbetriebe were industries which were the result of an agreement between Reich Minister Speer and, I believe, the French Minister of Economics, Bichelonne. They were industries which worked partly for German armaments and partly for German civilian requirements, and did not come under my offices. The number of workers brought from foreign countries to Germany, according to careful estimates and the records of the statistical department of the Reich Ministry of Labor, might be said to be about 5 million.

From Speer's IMT testimony: Of course, I expected Sauckel to meet above all the demands of war production, but it cannot be maintained that he primarily took care of my demands, for beginning with the spring of 1943 I received only part of the workers I needed. If my maximum had been met, I should have received all of them. For this I need cite but one example. During that same period some 200,000 Ukrainian women were made available for housework, and it is quite certain that I was of the opinion that they could be put to better use in armaments production. It is also clear that the German labor reserve had not been fully utilized. In January 1943 these German reserves were still ample. I was interested in having German workers-including, of course, women-and this non-utilization of German reserves also proves that I cannot be held solely responsible for covering the essential needs, that is, for demanding foreign labor.

I needed them only in part, in view of my requirements for production. For instance, the coal mines could not get along without Russian prisoners of war. It would have been quite impossible to employ German reserves, which consisted mainly of women, in these mines. There were, furthermore, special assignments for which it was desirable to have foreign skilled labor, but the majority of the needs could be met by German workers, even German female workers. The same principle was followed in the armament industries in England and America and certainly in the Soviet Union, too.

After this telephone call further measures were to be taken in France to increase the number of workers available for allocation. Minutes of a Fuehrer conference which I found recently, namely, those of the meeting of 3 to 5 January 1943, show that at that time Hitler's statement of opinion referred to increased employment of French people in France for local industry and economy. This record states that measures must be taken to raise economy in France to a higher level. It contains stern injunctions from Hitler concerning the ways and means that he contemplated using to this end. It states that acts of sabotage are to be punished with the most rigorous means and that "humanitarian muddle-headedness" is out of place.

These minutes also show that at that time I asked Hitler to transfer the management of production questions in France to me, a step which was actually taken several months later. I mention this only for the purpose of making it clear, while I am still in a position to testify as a witness, that I did not carry out Hitler's policy of abandoning all "humanitarian muddle-headedness" in France.

My attention was drawn to one case in which 10 hostages were to be shot as a reprisal for acts of industrial sabotage committed in the Meurthe-et-Moselle district. At that time I managed to prevent the sentence from being carried out. Roechling, who was at that time in charge of iron production in the occupied western territories, is my witness in this case. That is the only case I know of where hostages were to be shot on account of sabotage in production.

I can also prove that, through a decision by Hitler dated September 1943, I was responsible for providing a supplementary meal in addition to the existing ration for factory workers employed in France. In a letter which I sent to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in December 1943, I strongly urged the necessity not only of paying wages to the workers in the occupied western territories, but also of making available to them a corresponding quantity of consumer goods--a line of policy which doubtless does not accord with the policy of plundering the western regions, on which so much stress has been laid by the French Prosecution.

All three documents are in my possession and they can be produced. I only mention these facts to show that I neither approved nor followed the very harsh policy laid down by Hitler for application in France in the records of 3 to 5 January.

From Speer's IMT testimony: During these conferences representatives from my departments were sometimes present. They were present for the purpose of protecting the blocked factories and also to see to it that there were no encroachments on the production interests which I planned to protect. It was not the task of these representatives to act for or against Sauckel's demands, because Sauckel stated his demands in such a definite way that a subordinate official was not in a position to speak either for or against these demands in any way. This would have been a task which I would have had to carry out myself. My representatives were the representatives from the armament, from the heavy armament and war production in the occupied territories, and as such they had their special tasks.

From Stalingrad by Antony Beevor: Now the last letter from Ernst [Speer] in Stalingrad said that he could not stand watching his fellow patients die in the field hospital. He had rejoined his comrades in the front lines, despite his grotesquely swollen limbs and pathetic weakness.

From Speer's Spandau Draft: In mid-January Hitler, having at last realized Goering’s incapacity to act, finally ordered Milch to try to save the day. I drove to the airfield with him when he left Luftwaffe HQ south of the encircled city from where he would direct whatever rescue operations were still possible and he promised faithfully to try to find my brother. Despite the Russian's dreadfully effective air defense, he did manage to fly in a few supplies of food and medicines and, more extraordinary still, flew out another few thousand wounded. But he couldn't find my brother--the unit was reached for but it, and he, had disappeared. Like hundred of thousands of other soldiers, my brother was declared missing, presumed dead. (Sereny)

From Speer's IMT testimony: No, only Russian prisoners of war and Italian military internees were used for the production of arms. As for the use of French and other prisoners of war in this production I had several conferences with Keitel on the subject. And I must tell you that Keitel always adopted the view that these prisoners of war could not be used in violation of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. I can claim that on the strength of this fact I no longer used my influence to see that these prisoners of war should be used in armament industries in violation of the Geneva Convention; The conception, of course, "production of arms" is very much open to argument. It always depends on what position one takes, whether you have a wide conception of "armaments" or a narrow one.

From Speer's IMT testimony: Sauckel also testified here that after Stalingrad Goebbels and I started on the "total war effort." But that is not correct in this form. Stalingrad was in January 1943, and Goebbels started on his "total war effort" in August 1944. After Stalingrad a great reorganization program was to be carried out in Germany in order to free German labor. I myself was one of those who demanded this. Neither Goebbels nor I, however, was able to carry out this plan. A committee of three, Lammers, Keitel, and Bormann, was formed; but owing to their lack of technical knowledge they were unable to carry out their task.

From Speer's USSBS interview: Since I started my job, I have always sternly demanded that more women go to work than was the case before. Statistics of WW1 show that contribution then was far greater. It is correct, Sauckel and the Party protected the women, and said that they must not be used for labor to the same extent. One was of the opinion that the uses of women on a large scale would have badly influenced the morale of women, and that therefore it could not be done. In general the war was not taken seriously enough at home, almost up to its end, i.e. up to fall 1944.

Also the unconditional belief in victory—even with the Gauleiter’s—has something to do with it. They were too optimistic. Here our Reichs propaganda fired back [Note: Speer probably meant to say 'Here the our propaganda back-fired]. Nobody thought that we could lose the victory. The words of Churchill--'blood, sweat, and tears'--would have been the right slogan for us, too. Instead of that, we only had 'Our victory is assured.' Because of this mentality no Gauleiter wanted to make any personal sacrifices. It almost happened, against my protestations in 1943, that of the Ukrainian country girls, 200,000 entered households as maids instead of drawing maids into armament . . . .

That was what enervated me when I read British and American newspapers and pictures, and saw where, for instance, women built planes. One of the memoranda where I demanded the same concerns only this topic. The German workers too did not understand it. The workers were disturbed because women could stay at home, while the men had to put in overtime. That made the German (worker) as mad as it made me. But this was here a question of interior politics and I did not get my proposals through. Here at home we had only a few responsible people who wanted to take part in the war with their own sacrifices. All of them wanted to continue an easy life. If one demands things from the people one can only do it by starting at the head. If the minister or Gauleiter starts to send his maid away, he can demand the same of those further down. If he keeps her, one again arrives at compromises, and nothing happens. (SBS)

From Speer's IMT testimony: I wanted to prove ... that even according to Sauckel's opinion at the time he did not endeavor to bring workers to Germany from France, et cetera, corresponding to my maximum demands. For if in a report to Hitler he asserts that he brought more workers to the armament sector than I demanded, as can be seen from the letter then it would be clear that he did more than I asked him to do. Actually, it was quite different. In actual fact, he did not supply these workers at all, and we had a heated argument because it was my opinion that he had supplied a far smaller number and had boosted his report to Hitler. I have expressed clearly enough that I considered Sauckel's labor policy of bringing foreigners into Germany to be the proper course. I did not try to dodge that responsibility, but there did exist considerable reserves of German labor; that again is only proof of the fact that I was not responsible for the maximum demands made, and that was all I wanted to prove.

From Speer's Nuremberg Draft: He [Goering] viewed the situation exactly as we did and he was particularly struck when I told him that we were sure Bormann was seeking to succeed Hitler. I was able to present him with a number of details supporting this view. That certainly activated his juices! We reached complete agreement and decided to ask Goebbels to fly up the next day for a second conference.

By the next evening everything was decided: we would set up the Council of Ministers as a joint instrument of power; Goebbels and I would be appointed members. We set a date for a third meeting in Berlin [with Funk and Ley] after which we would proceed together against Bormann and his group. We would stand together, supporting each other in the decisive meeting with Hitler. All was agreed: a small conspiracy. (See: April 12, 1943)

From Speer's IMT testimony: The most modern equipment for the most modern weapons had been housed in subterranean factories. Since we did not have many of these subterranean works at our disposal, we had to house in the main this latest equipment there. This equipment required perfect conditions of work-air which was dry and free from dust, good lighting facilities, big fresh air installations, so that the conditions which applied to such a subterranean factory would be about the same as those in a night shift in a regular industry.

I should like to add that contrary to the impression which has been created here in Court, these subterranean factories, almost without exception, were staffed with German workers, because we had a special interest in having these modern installations manned by the best workers which were at our disposal. It was an insignificant number at the end of the war. We were using 300,000 square meters of subterranean premises and were planning for 3,000,000 square meters.

From Speer's IMT testimony: First I should like to comment on the document. The document does not show the total number of the workers to which the number of deaths refers, so that one cannot say whether that is an unnaturally high proportion of illness. At a session of the Central Planning Board which I read here again, I observed it was said that among the Russian workers there was a high rate of tuberculosis. I do not know whether you mean that. That was a remark which Weiger made to me. But presumably through the health offices we tried to alleviate these conditions. I do not know whether that was an abnormal death rate. But there was an abnormally high rate of tuberculosis at times.

From Speer's IMT testimony: Arrangements for transport trains were made by Sauckel and his staff. It is possible that air raids or a sudden change in the production program made it necessary for my office to ask for transport trains to be rerouted; but the responsibility for that always rested with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.

From The Arms of Krupp by William Manchester: The one consequence strategic bombing votaries hadn't expected, and which they have been trying to explain ever since, was an increase in output during heavy raids. Nevertheless that is what happened. The 'serious stoppages' Goebbels anticipated never occurred. Afterward Willi Schlieker—number three man in the Ministerium for Armament and War Production, after Speer himself and Karl-Otto Saur—revealed after the war that "as the bombings grew, so did German production, until on the very eve of defeat, when Germany had collapsed within, the Ruhr was producing more than ever before." Schlieker recalled that Hitler had told Speer, "Give me six hundred tanks a month, and we will abolish every enemy in the world." The Generalstab, said Willi, echoed the Fuehrer—"600 tanks a month, 600 was the magic figure. By the end of 1943 Germany was producing 1,000 tanks a month . . . . By November 1944, when the Allies had already made their first breach of German soil, Germany was producing 1,800 tank a month . . . . Production rose and soared . . . . By mid-1944 airplane production had reached a peak of 3,750 aircraft a month . . . .

Feldmarschall Walther Model might still be holding the Ruhr today if transportation hadn't broken down. His supply lines disintegrated because the railroad grid had become a hopeless snarl. Schlieker told American bombing experts that the Ruhrgebiet "ultimately collapsed, not because of the bombing of plants, mills and mines but because the railroad exits were so clogged with blowouts, breaks, and burnt-out locomotives that they could not carry away the 30,000 tons of finished goods the Ruhr produced every day.

From Speer's IMT testimony: Himmler ... wanted to build factories of his own in his concentration camps. Then he would have been able to produce arms without any outside control, which Hitler, of course, knew. The 5 percent arms production which was to have been handed to Himmler was to a certain extent a compensation for the fact that he himself gave up the idea of building factories in the camps. From the psychological point of view it was not so simple for me to get Himmler to give up this idea when he kept on reminding Hitler of it. I was hoping that he would be satisfied with the 5 percent arms production we were going to give him. Actually this 5 percent was never handed over. We managed things quietly with the Operations Staff of the OKW and with General Buhle, so that he never got the arms at all . . . .

I knew that the National Socialist Party was anti-Semitic, and I knew that the Jews were being evacuated from Germany. When, in February 1942, I took over my new office, the Party was already insisting that Jews ho were still working in armament factories should be removed from them. I objected at the time, and managed to get Bormann to issue a circular letter to the effect that these Jews might go on being employed in armament factories and that Party offices were prohibited from accusing the heads of these firms on political grounds because of the Jews working there. It was the Gauleiter who made such political accusations against the heads of concerns, and it was mostly in the Gau Saxony and in the Gau Berlin. So after this the Jews could remain in these plants.

Without having any authority to do so, I had had this circular letter from the Party published in my news sheet to heads of factories and had sent it to all concerned, so that I would in any case receive their complaints if the Party should not obey the instruction. After that the problem was left alone, until September or October of 1942. At that time a conference with Hitler took place, at which Sauckel also was present. At this conference Hitler insisted emphatically that the Jews must now be removed from the armament firms, and he gave orders for this to be done--this will be seen from a Fuehrer protocol which has been preserved. In spite of this we managed to keep the Jews on in factories and it was only in March 1943, as this letter shows, that resistance gave way and the Jews finally did have to get out.

I must point out to you that, as far as I can remember, it was not yet a question of the Jewish problem as a whole, but in the years 1941 and 1942 Jews had gone to the armament factories to do important war work and have an occupation of military importance; they were able to escape the evacuation which at that time was already in full swing. They were mostly occupied in the electrical industry, and Geheimrat Bucher, of the electrical industry--that is AEG and Siemens--no doubt lent a helping hand in order to get the Jews taken on there in greater numbers. These Jews were completely free and their families were still in their homes.

The letter by Gauleiter Sauckel you have before you was not, of course, submitted to me; and Sauckel says that he himself had not seen it. But it is certainly true that I knew about it before action was taken; I knew because the question had to be discussed as to how one should get replacements. It is equally certain, though, that I also protested at the time at having skilled labor removed from my armament industries because, apart from other reasons, it was going to make things difficult for me ... if the Jews who were evacuated had been allowed to work for me, it would have been a considerable advantage to me.